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EUROPEAN COMMISSION - CONCENTRATIONS - NESTLE'S BID To
TAKEOVER PERRIER: A LANDMARK MERGER RESTRUCTURING ON
DUOPOLY GROUNDS
I. FACTS
On March 25, 1992, Nestle SA won an arduous takeover battle of Source
Perrier SA and its mineral water collection.' Nestle bid $2.7 billion, about
$302 per share for Perrier,2 ending a five-month takeover process involving
several suitors for the target company. On March 26, 1992, the European
Commission, the 17-member executive arm of the European Community
(EC), began an inquiry into the acquisition to determine whether the deal
would limit free trade.'
The Commission determined that the proposed merger as initially
presented by Nestle could impede competition in the common market and
was therefore incompatible with the common market.4 Because it had
determined the proposed merger limited free trade, the Commission worked
out a proposal with Nestle whereby Nestle agreed to modify the initial
merger plan by fulfilling a series of commitments.' On July 22, 1992, after
approving Nestle's modified merger proposal, the Commission approved the
'EC Panel Reviewing Perrier Deal, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26, 1992, at B2. The merger plan
involved .dividing Perrier between Nestle and BSN, a large French food and beverage
company. Brian Love, EC To Review Nestle Perrier Merger, PHILA. ENQUIRER, Mar. 26,
1992, at B14.
2 EC Panel Reviewing Perrier Deal, supra note 1. In June of 1992 Nestle and BSN bid
$315 per share for the remaining outstanding Perrier stock which amounts to about 3% of
Perrier. Firm Seeks Remaining Perrier Shares, STAR TRiB. (Minn./St. Paul), June 4, 1992,
at D3.
3 EC Panel Reviewing Perrier Deal, supra note 1.
4 Commission Decision 92/553 EEC, recital 135, 1992 O.J. (L 356) 29 [hereinafter
Commission Decision].
- Id. recital 136, at 29. Nestle agreed to sell the Vichy, Thonon, Pierval, and Saint-Yorre
as well as other smaller water brands, formerly owned by Perrier, to a new buyer who could
cultivate the brands into competition with Nestle and BSN. Id. Nestle agreed not to
repurchase the brands for at least ten years. Id. at 30. The assets and interests acquired from
Perrier are to be held separate from Nestle's operations until the sale is complete. Id. at 29.
Nestle is restrained from providing data on sales volumes to competitors. Id. Additionally,
Nestle is prohibited from selling Volvic to BSN until the sale of the Perrier brands is
completed. Id. at 30.
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takeover of Perrier SA by Nestle SA.6
Under EC merger regulations,' the Commission must approve large
mergers in the twelve-nation ECs and has the power to block an alliance if
it feels that free trade would be reduced. The Commission raised doubts
about the validity of the original Nestle proposal because the merger created
market shares exceeding fifty percent and could create an excessive
concentration in the French bottled water market.9
Because the Merger Regulation text does not expressly mention or prohibit
duopolistic market positions, the decision by the Commission tested the
limits of the Commission's regulatory powers'0 and indicated that the
Commission has the authority to block the creation of restrictive duopo-
lies."
II. LAW
A. Prior Merger Regulation In The EC
The European Community (EC) was established in 1957 when six
European nations 2 signed the European Economic Community Treaty
(Treaty of Rome) 3 with the goal of creating a common market by 1970."4
The Treaty provided for "the establishment of a system ensuring that
competition [would not be] distorted in the Common Market."' 5  To
preserve competition in the community, mergers were regulated by separate
policies of individual member states and also by Articles 85 and 86 of the
6 Id. art. 1, at 31.
'Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings 4064/89,
1990 O.J. (L 257) 13 (corrected version) [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
L The twelve nations include France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal.
9 EC Panel Reviewing Perrier Deal, supra note 1. The Commission based part of its
decision on competition within a single country, France, instead of looking at the effects to
the EC as a whole. Commission Decision, supra note 4, recital 21, at 7.
'o Nestle Perrier Decision Tests Extent of EC Powers, Bus. EUR. (Switz.), July 31, 1992.
" Commission Decision, supra note 4, at 24, 25.
32 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
" TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, [EEC TREATY].
4 By 1986 there were twelve nations in the community. Other nations joining included
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981, and finally Spain and
Portugal in 1986.




Article 85 prohibits price-fixing, production controls, and other actions by
undertakings 6 which may distort, prevent, or restrict competition within the
common market. 7  Because those practices are inconsistent with the
common market, any agreements violating Article 85 are automatically void.
Article 86 prohibits as incompatible with the common market any "abuse"
of a dominant position within the Common Market (or a substantial part
thereof) by an undertaking. The Article lists possible abuses such as
imposing unfair prices and limiting production, markets, or technology to the
'6 Undertaking is the EC term for firms or companies.
17 EEC TR-ATY art. 85.
Article 85 provides-
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common
Market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market, and
in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers
a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
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detriment of consumers. 18
The first landmark in the historical application of Treaty articles for
merger control was the Commission Memorandum on Concentrations of
1966.' In the Memorandum, the Commission distinguished between a
"concentration"'  and an agreement between companies. The Commission
concluded that Article 85 did not apply to concentrations but that Article 86
did.2
1
In 1972, the Continental Can case2 established the power of Article 86
to regulate a company in a dominant position which acquires a competi-
tor.' This was a significant decision because Article 86 does not specifi-
"a EEC TREATY art. 86.
Article 86 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the Common Market insofar as it may affect trade
between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
'9 Memorandum on the Problem of Concentrations in the Common Market, Competition
Series, Study No. 3 (Brussels 1966) [hereinafter Memorandum].
' Concentration is the EC term describing mergers, acquisitions, and certain joint ven-
tures. Id.
21 id.
2 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v EEC Commission, 1973
E.C.R. 215, 12 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973).
2 The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) held in Continental Can that
an acquiring company has abused its dominant position when it restrains competition to the
point where all remaining undertakings are dependent-on the dominant one. Id. at 244-45.
The standard for abuse was changed in subsequent article 86 cases to an action that hinders
the maintenance of the degree of competition in the market. See Case 27/76, United Brands
Co. v. EEC Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 3 C.M.L.R. 83 (1978) where the ECJ defined
dominance as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it
to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the
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cally contain an express provision to this extent.24
The need for merger control at the European level became evident as the
Commission intervened more and more in concentration cases under Articles
85 and 86. Merger regulation under Articles 85 and 86 had many
drawbacks including long time delays, uncertainty due to the informal
clearance process, and differences in standards between Article 85 and
Article 86. As the ability to reach larger consumer bases grew and market
opportunities increased due to the integration of the European economy, the
number of mergers and acquisitions in the EC increased,' and thus the
need for clear, consistent regulation became urgent.
B. The New EC Merger Regulation
The Commission submitted the first proposal for a European regulation on
merger control in 197327 in response to the shortcomings of the established
system of regulation and control. Opposition by individual member states
thwarted the unanimous approval required to pass the initial draft and the
regulation was not enacted. 2 The present merger regulation was finally
adopted on December 21, 1989 and became effective September 21, 1990.29
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers, and
ultimately of its consumers."
2 EEC TREATY art. 86; see also Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 24445.
2 Terence P. Stewart, Merger Control in the European Community: The EC Regulation
"On The Control Of Concentrations Between Undertakings" and Implementing Guidelines,
11 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 293, 312 (1990).
' Peat Marwick reported that in 1989 ihe number of cross border mergers and
acquisitions in Europe rose to 1,314 from 847, with a respective increase in value to $50
billion from $31.6 billion. Cross-Border Mergers Rose by 8% in 1989, Study Says, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at AS.
27 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1973 O.J. (C92) 1.
28 The External Impact of European Unification, Apr. 7, 1989, vol. 1, no. 1, at 1. The
United Kingdom opposed the regulation and sought to fix the threshold level at a high level
in order to minimize the number of mergers subject to the regulation. Id.
2 EC Expected to Make Changes in Nestle's Buyout of Perrier, S.F. CHRON., July 20,
1992, at B3.
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In discussions with Member States prior to the new regulation, several
principles emerged to guide the drafting of the new proposal. 0 One
principle maintained that in order to prevent the creation or enlargement of
a dominant position, merger control under the new regulation should apply
to large-scale mergers that have a "truly European dimension., 31 Limiting
most regulation of large-scale mergers within the EC to the Commission
32
will enable Member States to concentrate their regulation efforts on small
mergers which primarily affect local markets. The principle of allowing the
Commission to regulate all mergers which meet the threshold requirements
of the Merger Regulation is incorporated into the Regulation and is known
as the "one-stop shop." If a merger meets the threshold qualifications of the
Merger Regulation,33 the Commission has the sole authority to evaluate the
proposal.' Once the Commission has approved the proposal, the undertak-
ings do not have to worry about interference from individual Member States
30 Wayne Collins, The Coming of Age of EC Competition Policy, 17 YALE J. INT'L L.
249, 278 (1992) (reviewing LEON BRrrTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL
IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (1991)).
31 Merger Regulation, supra note 7, para. 6 states that:
Articles 85 and 86, while applicable, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, to
certain concentrations, are not however, sufficient to control all operations which may prove
to be incompatible with the system of undistorted competition envisaged in the Treaty.
32 The Merger Regulation draws its power from Article 87 of the Treaty of Rome which
allows the Council the authority to promulgate regulations to implement Articles 85 and 86.
The Merger Regulation also draws power from Article 235 which allows the Council authority
to take "appropriate measures" necessary to achieve one of the Community's stated objectives
where the Treaty itself fails to provide the requisite powers. This gives the Merger Regula-
tion a legal status equivalent to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.
33 The new Regulation applies to all concentrations with a "community dimension."
Merger Regulation, supra note 7, art. 1(2) states that a concentration has a Community
dimension where:
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings
concerned is more than ECU 5000 million; and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
3' Merger Regulation, supra note 7, art. 21 states:
(1) Subject to the review by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall
have sole jurisdiction to take the decisions provided for in this Regulation.
(2) No Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition
to any consideration that has a Community Dimension.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
who may oppose the deal.
When the Commission published the new regulation, it announced some
key principles that it believed would improve legal certainty involving
corporate mergers. 5 The principles were designed to enhance certainty in
three areas: the jurisdiction to review mergers, the definition of rules under
which mergers are to be evaluated, and the Commission clearance proce-
dures. 6 First, the Regulation gives the Commission jurisdiction over all
mergers with a "Community Dimension ' 37 and removes the uncertainty that
resulted from the dual jurisdiction under the prior system. The Regulation
will enable companies to better predict which jurisdiction their proposals will
fall into and thus predict with increased certainty the decision that will
follow. Second, the Merger Regulation attempts to provide undertakings a
more concrete standard of how their proposals will be reviewed. 38 Concen-
trations that are found to threaten competition in the Common Market will
5 Stewart, supra note 25, at 299.
36 id.
37 See supra note 33 for a definition of Community Dimension.
s The test is presented in Article 2 of the Merger Regulation, supra note 7, which states:
1. Concentrations within the scope of this Regulation shall be
appraised in accordance with the following provisions with a view to
establishing whether or not they are compatible with the Common Market.
In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account:
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the
Common Market in view of, among other things, the structure of all the
markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from undertak-
ings located either within or outwith [sic] the Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their eco-
nomic and financial power, the alternatives available to suppliers and
users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to
entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the
interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development
of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers'
advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.
2. A concentration which does not create or strengthen a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be de-
clared compatible with the Common Market.
3. A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position
as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded
in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared
incompatible with the Common Market.
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be blocked or restructured. 39  Finally, the Merger Regulation imposes
notification requirements on the undertakings4o and imposes strict time
limits on the Commission to respond to the notifications.4' Thus, the
period of time companies must wait for the Commission to approve or reject
a merger proposal is decreased.
C. EC Regulation of Collective Dominance
Dominance in a particular market is not always maintained by one large
firm or concentration. Collective dominance occurs when a duopoly (two
market controlling firms) or an oligopoly (multiple firms) exists. In the
Nestle case, the Commission believes that Nestle and BSN combined will
control an exceptionally large share of the bottled water market. The
duopoly formed by Nestle and BSN would allow the two companies to act
in concert to set prices at higher levels.
In the past, regulation of duopolies within the EC has been mixed. While
applying Articles 85 and 86 to merger regulation in the EC,42 the Court of
Justice never found individual dominance to exist with a market share below
forty percent.43 The Commission, however, prosecuted cases charging firms
with collective dominance in a market even though the firms did not have
individual dominance in a market.44
Prior to the Merger regulation, collective dominance was regulated by
Article 864' which referred to "one or more undertakings of a dominant
position" in the common market. Historically, the Court of Justice has not
supported the Commission's attempts to prosecute joint dominance under
39 Id. Articles 8(2) and 8(4) allow the Commission to attach conditions or restructure a
proposal in order to ensure a sufficient level of competition in the market.
4 Id. art. 4.
41 Id. art. 10.
42 Aside from cases in which, because of customer dependence, dominance has been
found to exist with respect to a company's own products regardless of its market share.
43 James S. Venit, The Evaluation of Concentrations Under Regulation 4064/89: The
Nature of the Beast, 1990 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 519, 531; see Case 27/76 United Brands
Co. v Commission, 6, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 282, (noting that United Brand's market share was
always more than forty percent).
44 See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461 (rejecting a
theory of collective dominance based on conscious parallelism); Case 40/73, Cooperative
Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA V. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1663.
45 EEC TREATY art. 86.
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Article 86.' The Merger Regulation presumes that any concentration in
which the undertakings hold a market share of less than twenty-five percent
is compatible with the Common Market," but it does not specifically
mention collective dominance.
III. ANALYSIS
The Nestle acquisition of Perrier is a landmark case in the young and
uncharted life of the new Merger Regulation." Because the Nestle
acquisition is the fast case that the Commission has challenged on duopoly
grounds49 the EC merger atmosphere is full of uncertainty about future
interpretation of the Merger Regulation. The Merger Regulation controls
proposed mergers of EC based companies as well as companies outside of
the Community whose mergers have substantial effects within the EC.-'
Because the Regulation has an extra-territorial reach, any policy changes by
the Commission concerning the Merger Regulation will have an impact on
future world corporate strategy.
A. Legal Basis For Regulating Collective Dominance
To many in the corporate world, the legal basis of the Commission's
duopoly principle is unknown since the Merger Regulation does not
explicitly refer to joint dominance by multiple firms.5' Nestle has accused
the Commission of changing the rules in the middle of the game. Addition-
ally, some lawyers point out that the decision is just another example of
Brussels pushing the boundaries of the text farther than anyone expected.52
Venit, supra note 43, at 539; see Hoffman LaRoche, supra note 44.
' Merger Regulation, supra note 7, at 15.
Sir Leon Brittan, EC competition commissioner, hailed the Commission's decision to
allow the deal to proceed with conditions as "a considerable victory for the consumer" and
a landmark in Brussels' rapidly evolving merger policy. Experts agree that this is a landmark
development, which should in theory enable Brussels to apply the two-year-old EC Merger
Regulation to large cross-border deals in any industry where the number of competitors is
limited. Andrew Hill & Guy de Jonquieres, Commission Clears Bid For Perrier, FIN. TIMES,
July 23, 1992, at 2.
4Id.
s Merger Regulation, supra note 7, art. 1.
s, Hill & de Jonquieres, supra note 48, at 16.
52 Id.
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After reviewing Nestle's proposal, including the sale of Volvic from
Nestle to BSN, the Commission found that the merger would create
duopolistic dominance and might impede effective competition in a substan-
tial part of the common market. 3 The Nestle decision appears to be
grounded in the spirit and intent of EC competition policy as set forth in the
EEC Treaty' and the Merger Regulation. The central question posed by
the Commission is whether Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation covers
only competition impeded by a single firm, or whether the provision also
covers impeded competition resulting from collective dominance."5 The
ruling indicates that the decisive issue for the Commission is not the
distinction between single firm dominance and multiple firm dominance, but
whether competition is impeded.-6
The Commission's formal report provides several reasons why the
Commission felt that it had the authority and the obligation to regulate the
Nestle merger on duopolistic grounds. First, as noted above, the Commis-
sion did not think that the number of firms involved was a sufficient reason
to approve a merger that might otherwise impede effective competition in the
common market. The Commission stated that dominant position is only the
means of impeding competition, and that a dominant position may be held
by a group of firms as well as by a single firm."
The second reason for regulation of multiple-firm dominance involves the
gap in competition policy which would result from an inability to prevent
market dominance by a group of firms.58 The structure of EC competition
policy divides coverage of most mergers between the Merger Regulation and
national regulations, based on the size and impact of the merger.5 9 Most
mergers which meet the threshold coverage requirements of the Merger
Regulation fall outside of regulation by individual Member States of the EC,
" Commission Decision, supra note 4, recital 108, at 23. In deciding that the initial
merger proposal was not compatible with the Common Market, the Commission considered
the high market shares of Nestle and BSN after the transfer of Volvic from Nestle to BSN,
the absence of effective counter competition from local suppliers, and the increasing reliance
of consumers on brands sold by Nestle and BSN along with other factors. Id.
54 EEC TREATY art. 3(f) (providing for a system ensuring undistorted competition in the
Common Market.)
55 Commission Decision, supra note 4, recital 110, at 24.
MId. recital 112, at 24.
"Id. recital 113, at 24.
RId. recital 114, at 24.
9 Merger Regulation, supra note 7, art. 1.
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many of whose regulations control duopolistic dominance.6 If an anticom-
petitive merger which would create a duopoly or oligopoly falls into the
Commission's sole jurisdiction but cannot be blocked on duopolistic grounds,
competition could suffer simply because a dominant position was created by
a tight group of firms as opposed to one firm acting alone. The Commis-
sion's decision relies on the principle that a core intent of EC competition
law should not be circumventable because an express prohibition on
multiple-firm dominance was omitted from the regulation.6' In addition,
the Commission noted that national legislation in many countries allows for
the implied regulation of possible multi-firm dominance even though oli-
gopolies are not expressly mentioned in the statutes.62
During the Commission's investigation of the Nestle proposal, BSN
argued that the decision of the Commission violated the principle of legal
certainty because the Nestle proposal is the first merger facing rejection by
the Commission based on duopolistic grounds.63 The Commission rejected
BSN's argument because Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation covers
dominance which might impede competition in the Common Market
independently of whether the dominance is by a single firm or a collection
of firms.'
The Nestle decision appears to be solidly within the spirit and purpose of-
the Merger Regulation, which requires the Commission to take into account
the need to preserve and maintain competition in the Common Market,65
because duopolies often stifle effective price competition. The Merger
Regulation design ensures that competition in the Common Market is not
Commission Decision, supra note 4, recital 115, at 25.
61 Id. recital 114, at 24.
62 Id. Sir Leon Brittan argues that the position of the Commission is consistent with the
Merger Regulation, and that he is only bringing EC merger policy into line with the practice
in nations such as Britain, Germany, and the United States. All of these countries can
challenge oligopolies but only Germany has legislation which mentions them explicitly.
Andrew Hill & Guy de Jonquieres, Source of Change for Mergers, FIN. TIMEs, July 23, 1992,
at 16.
63 Commission Decision, supra note 4, recital 116, at 25.
" Id. The Commission noted that because mergers must be approved prior to
implementation, the results in the Nestle decision are not as severe as other possible situations
where already acquired rights are involved. Id.
65 Venit, supra note 43, at 541.
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distorted.' Prior to the Commission's conditions of divestment, Nestle and
BSN would have combined to control sixty-seven percent of the French
mineral water market.67 Because the market is hard to enter successfully
Nestle and BSN would have faced few new competitors in the future and
they possibly could have set the prices of their products above market levels.
B. Future Effects of The Nestle Decision
The effects of the Nestle decision on future mergers in the EC are unclear,
but many experts think that the Nestle case could expand the Commission's
power to block a concentration and could ultimately restrict corporate growth
through acquisitions." Although the decision could possibly restrict
corporate expansion by merger," results of past proposals submitted to the
Commission indicate that mergers should still remain an effective means of
corporate growth. The overwhelming majority of proposed concentrations
have been approved without any formal inquiry by the Commission," and
only one proposal has been blocked by the Commission under the Merger
Regulation."
"Merger Regulation, supra note 7, para. (1). The Commission commented in 1986 that
one principle behind the proposed Merger Regulation was "to prevent the creation of
situations which will result in stable collusion between oligopolists." Venit, supra note 43,
at 533.
6 Hill & de Jonquieres, supra note 62.
" Mr. Reto Dominiconi, finance director at Nestle, stated that if the duopoly position is
upheld "it would be a very major hurdle to many future acquisitions," particularly hostile
ones. Guy de Jonquieres, A thirst for expansion, FIN. TIMEs, July 8, 1992, at 20.
"Stephen Walzer, British Petroleum's manager of international legal affairs, thinks that
there will be major implications for industries like oil. Derek Ridyard, an economic
consultant of Nera, predicted the impact will be felt in any business where high capital costs
limit competitive entry, and in industries where many product categories are dominated by
several large brands such as the consumer food industry. Id.
7' Since the Merger Regulation took effect the Commission has investigated in depth only
eight of the roughly one hundred deals notified to it and has blocked only one. Source of
Change, supra note 62.
7' Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42. Aerospatiale and Alenia
agreed to purchase the de Havilland division of Boeing of Canada. The Commission
reportedly rejected the proposed joint acquisition because the concentration would have given
Aerospatiale-Alenia at least fifty percent of the worldwide market and at least sixty-seven
percent of the EC market for consumer aircraft twenty-to-seventy-passenger range. James S.




Business leaders throughout the EC are watching for a possible expansion
in the scope of the Commission's authority. If the Nestle case establishes
grounds for rejecting proposed mergers that create duopolies, the Commis-
sion might seek to expand its powers by challenging looser oligopolies in
future merger cases.72 This expansion of Commission power could eventu-
ally create an atmosphere where aggressive corporate merger policy
stagnates, limiting corporate growth in a major area.
Although the ruling in the Nestle case will probably not lead to a decline
in the level of corporate mergers in the EC, the only official way for the EC
corporate community to challenge the power of the Commission is to appeal
a decision to the Court of Justice. This has not occurred to date largely
because of the time and cost restraints involved in the process.
C. The EC and Objective Merger Review
The Commission is composed of nationals of Member States, with each
nation allowed representation by at most two individuals.74 To ensure
objectivity, the Commissioners are required to act "in the general interest of
the Communities," to perform their duties independently, and to refrain from
seeking or taking any instructions from any national government." The
Nestle decision has spurred calls for a system that provides more predictable
and objective review of concentrations 76 because many feel that the decision
of the Commission was politically influenced.
EC Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan defended the Commission
against attacks which called for an independent agency, free from political
pressure, to handle merger control." Brittan commented that the Commis-
Hill & de Jonquieres, supra note 62.
Merger Regulation, supra note 7, art. 16. Nestle was prepared to appeal any Commis-
sion decision that would completely block their takeover of Perrier with BSN. Id.; Hill & de
Jonquieres, supra note 62. Decisions of the Commission are reviewable by the Court of First
Instance and thereafter by the Court of Justice. Graham Smith, EC Merges Control
Regulation-the First Nine Months, INT'L MERGER L., Aug. 1991, at 12.
' Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, art. 10(1) 1967 OJ. (152).
7 Id. art. 10(2). Member States have agreed not to seek to influence commissioners in
the performance of their duties. Id.
76 Hill & de Jonquieres, supra note 62.
" Brittan Rejects Critics' Call For A New, Independent EC Merger Agency, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) (March 11, 1992).
1993]
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sion would only be allowed to enjoy responsibility for merger control as long
as it is perceived to be capable of resisting political pressures and deciding
matters based on a fair interpretation of EC merger policy,7 and he stated
that the Commission so far has succeeded in that task.79 Two issues appear
to block the realistic creation of a truly independent review board. First, any
new agency would be subject to the same political pressure that influences
the Commission and its members.' Second, the negotiations on the Merger
Regulation took sixteen years to complete and it would be difficult to
convince EC member countries to agree on a new system." With these
considerations in mind, the present Commission appears to be the best
objective body'to review merger control in the EC.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment in 1990, the EC Merger Regulation has charted a new
course for the European Community. The Nestle decision is one important
highlight in the short history of the Merger Regulation. The Commission
followed what it believed to be the spirit and purpose of the Regulation and
restructured Nestle's bid for Perrier on the grounds that the original plan
would create a duopoly and might distort effective competition in the
Common Market, specifically in the bottled water market in France.
It is unclear what effect this extension of power by the Commission will
have on future mergers in the EC. However, based on the Merger Regula-
tion's track record, it appears that corporations striving for growth will
continue to pursue such undertakings as mergers and acquisitions. The
Merger Regulation has not existed without criticism, but at the present time
it appears to be the best objective system of controlling competition in the
Common Market.




81 Id. Brittan pointed to the EC's current long-time stalemate over the seat of several new
EC agencies and wondered how long it would take to resolve the question of where the seat
of any new merger authority would be.
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